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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

]

Ho. 90-7099

·1

J
]

ANN B. HOPKINS,

Plaint iff-Ap pellee,

v.
PRICE WATERHOUSE,

]

Defend ant-Ap pellant .

]

On Appeal from the United States Distri ct Court
For the Distri ct of Columb ia
BRIEF OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

COMMISSION AS

AMICUS CURIAE

STATEMENT OF INTEREST
The Equal Employ ment Opport unity Commis sion is the agency

I
:1

charge d by Congre ss with the interp retatio n, admin istratio n, and
enforce ment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amende d, 42

u.s.c.

§

2000e tl ~ , and other federa l statute s
This appeal presen ts

]

prohib iting employ ment discrim ination .

]

plaint iff has proven that an employ ment decisio n was based in

]
]

]
]

import ant issues involv ing a defend ant's burden of proof after a

part on sexual stereot ypes as well as a distri ct court' s
author ity, under Title VII, to order a partne rship to make a
former employ ee a partne r.

Becaus e the resolu tion of these

']

·1
']

]
]

]

issues will affect the Commissio n's enforceme nt of Title VII and
other fair employmen t statutes, we offer our views to the Court.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court correctly held that, in order

to prove that it would have made the same decision to "hold"
Hopkins• partnersh ip candidacy in the absence of sex
discrimin ation, Price Waterhous e had to show that the critical
comments it relied on were not based on the sexual stereotyp ing

]

which infected its decision-m aking process.

]

the doctrine of law of the case, it was bound by this Court's

]
]
]

2.

Whether the district court correctly held that, under

earlier holding that Hopkins was construct ively discharge d when
she was not reproposed for partnersh ip.
3.

Whether the district court correctly held that Title VII

gives it the authority to order a partnersh ip to admit to its
ranks a qualified candidate who would have been admitted by the
partnersh ip but for her sex.

I
l
]

PERTINENT STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
All applicabl e statutes are contained in the Brief of
Appellant .

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdicti on of this appeal from a final

]

judgment pursuant to 28

u.s.c.

1291.

§

]

]
]

]

2

]

J

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural History

]

A.

]

set out in Appellee• s brief.

]

The procedura l history of this case is fully and accurately

B.

statement of the Facts
In 1982, Ann Hopkins was proposed for partnersh ip in Price

]

Waterhous e by the unit of the firm for which she worked.

]

partnersh ip considere d that year .

op. at 5.

She was the only woman among the 88 candidate s for

.I.sL. at 6.

seven of the firm's 662 partners were women •

]
]
]

Slip

By July 1984, only

.I.sL.

As part of

the decision-m aking process, the firm solicited comments from
partners about Hopkins' suitabilit y •

.I.sL. at 5.

The comments about Hopkins' work were uniformly favorable •

.I.sL.

The contract awards she won were often cited, including one

valued between $34 and $44 million with the Departmen t of State

.l
I
l
]
]

]

which the Senior Partner regarded as a "leading credentia l"
enabling the firm to secure additiona l contracts .

Price Waterhous e, 825 F.2d 458, 462 (O.c. cir. 1987).

I

None of

the other partnersh ip candidate s compared with her in terms of
successfu lly procuring business for the firm.

Hopkins v. Price

Waterhous e, 618 F. supp. 1109, 1112 (O.o.c. 1985).
However, a number of partners opposed Hopkins' candidacy
because of perceived deficienc ies in her relations with other
personnel in the firm.

Slip op. at 5.

Some of these partners

made critical comments about Hopkins' lack of interperso nal

l
]

Hopkins v.

3

]

]
]
]

skills which were couched in terms of her sex. 1
criticiz ed her in neutral terms. 2

]
]

In addition , some of the

partners who supporte d Hopkins ' candidac y comment ed on her
difficu lties getting along with others, some in sex-base d terms, 3
others in neutral terms. 4

]

Others

None of the partner s, however,

criticiz ed Hopkins ability to get along with clients nor did any
of her clients express any displeas ure with her persona lly or
profess ionally.

618 F. Supp. at 1112.

very pleased with her work."

They "appear to have been

I.sL.5

1

_]

]
]

For example , one pariner noted that "she may have
overcom pensated for being a woman," 618 F.Supp. at 1115, while
another comment ed that she needs a "course in charm schoo l,"~
at 1116.
2

For example , one detracto r said Hopkins is "univer sally
disliked ," Hopkins v, Price Waterhouse, 109 u.s. 1775, 1783
{1988), and another said she is "consis tently annoying and
irritati ng." I.sL.
3

]

I
]

J
_}

l
]

For example , partners were critica l of her use of
profani ty "because its a lady using foul languag e," 618 F. Supp.
at 1116, another support er said that she initiall y gives the
impressi on of being "macho," .i..!;L_, and a third said that "she had
matured from a tough-ta lking, somewha t masculin e hard-nos ed mgr.
to an authori tative, formidab le, but much more appealin g lady
partner candid ate."~
4

For example , in Dr. Fiske's testimon y, she states that
partners initiall y supporti ve of Hopkins ' candidac y commente d
that "she is plain rough on people," "the.re is a risk she may
abuse authori ty," and that she is "abrasiv e." Tr. at 555, 558.
5

Candida te critique s were laced with gender specific
comment s in years previous to Hopkins ' candidac y as well. Women
candida tes were regarded "favorab ly if they maintain ed their
feminin ity while becoming effectiv e manager s." 618 F. Supp. at
1117. Price Waterho use rejected at least two women candida tes
"because partners believed they were curt, brusque and abrasive ,
acted like 'Ma Barker' or tried to be 'one of the boys.'" I.sL.
Further, when conside ring employe es as potentia l partners , one
partner stated on more than one occasion that he would never
conside r any woman as a serious partners hip candida te and did not
4

:1
]

After reviewing the partners' comments, the firm's
Admission's Committee recommended that Hopkins' candidacy be held

]

for at least one year.

1
:1
]

1
]
]
]

Isl... at 1113.

who had the responsibili ty for explaining to Hopkins the reasons
for the decision, advised her that to improve her chances of
becoming a partner she should "walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
styled, and wear jewelry."

Isl... at 1117.

I

When her unit decided

several months later not to repropose her for partnership, 6
Hopkins resigned from the firin.

lJL.. at 1113.

Dr. Susan Fiske, an expert on stereotyping within business
organization s { ~ at 1117), testified that there was a high
degree of probability that the comments couched in sexist terms
as well as many of those expressed in neutral terms were the
product of sexual stereotyping .

]

Thomas Beyer, the partner

M.i. at 1117-18.

Dr. Fiske noted

that the negative comments phrased in neutral terms related to
the same perceived deficiency in Hopkins' ability to get along
with others that was criticized in sex-based terms by some

]

partners {tr. at 558), and that a number of the facially neutral

]

believe that women should hold top managerial positions at Price
Waterhouse • .I9..:_ This partner's comments were neither corrected
nor discouraged by the firm. ~

]
]

J
J
I

6

The court found that the decision not to repropose
Hopkins was a result of the decision by two partners in her
division who had supported her partnership the first time not to
support it any longer. 825 F.2d at 463. The partners' change in
position was due in part, the court found, to Hopkins'
misrepresent ation of statements by the chairman of the firm in an
effort to pressure them into supporting her partnership bid. Tr.
at 387-88.
5

-~"J
~

comment s, even some by partner s who had very little contact with
Hopkins , were so intensel y negative that they indicate d reliance

J

on stereoty pes.

1

probabi lity that sexual stereoty pes infected the partners hip

.l
1
1
1
]

825 F.2d at 467.

Accordin g to Dr. Fiske, the

decision -making process was also indicate d by the followin g
factors: that Hopkins was the only woman among the candida tes for
partner ship (.isLJ; that the criteria used were inheren tly
ambigu ous(~) ; that many of the comment s were essenti ally
advising Hopkins to behave more like a woman and less like a man
(tr. at 554); and that Price Waterho use did not disavow even the
most extreme comment s.

618 F. Supp. at 1119.

In its initial decision , the distric t court found that
sexual stereoty ping infected Price Waterho use's conside ration of

]

Hopkins • candidac y for partners hip.

l

about Hopkins ' problem s dealing with staff, it was also evident

J
]
]

~

at 1120.

Judge Gesell

found that, although there was a basis for legitima te concern

that some of the criticis ms were the product of stereoty pes.

~

Because Price Waterho use failed to prove by clear and convinci ng
evidenc e that it would have made the same decision if sexual
stereoty pes had not been used in evaluati ng Hopkins, the court
held that she was entitled to retrospe ctive relief.

However ,

because it found that Hopkins was not constru ctively discharg ed

]

and that the decision not to repropos e her for partners hip was

]
]
]

]

6

not discrim inatory , the court held that she was not entitle d to
7
an order direct ing the firm to make her a partne r.

This Court affirme d the finding that Price Waterh ouse
violate d Title VII and agreed with the distri ct court that
retrosp ective relief was approp riate becaus e the firm failed to
prove by clear and convin cing eviden ce that it would have made
the same decisio n absent discrim ination .

825 F.2d at 472.

This

Court, howeve r, reverse d the distri ct court' s holding that
Hopkin s was not constr uctive ly discha rged becaus e, in its view,
the firm's failure to renomi nate Hopkin s as partne r was a
"caree r-endin g action ."

.IsL. at 473.

The Suprem e Court affirme d the lower courts ' finding that
sexual stereot yping played a role in the decisio n not to grant

Hopkin s a partne rship.

•]

8

109 s.ct. 1775 (1989).

Howeve r, the

Court held that Price Waterh ouse could avoid liabili ty, not just
retrosp ective relief , if it could prove by a prepon derance of the
eviden ce that it would have made the same decisio n if Hopkin s'
sex had not been a factor.

109 s.ct. at 1795.

Since the

distri ct court had applied a more string ent eviden tiary standa rd,
the Court remand ed the case for furthe r procee dings .

.IsL_

Withou t opinio n, this Court then vacate d the distric t court's
The court also denied all backpa y becaus e Hopkin s,
operat ing under a stipula tion which had not been approve d by the
court, failed to introdu ce eviden ce of her lost wages during the
trial on liabil ity.
7

]

The Court noted that Price Waterh ouse did not seek review
of the court of appeal s' decisio n that Hopkin s was constr uctive ly
discha rged.
8

]
]
I

7

~,I
.J
•
'

)

I
]

"judgment" as well as its own 1987 "mandate" and remanded the
case to the district court for further proceedings consistent
with the supreme Court decision.

c.

District court Decision
On remand, Price Waterhouse declined the district court's

invitation to present more evidence on the question of
liability, 9 arguing instead that the evidence already in the
record established that it would not have granted Hopkins a

1
1

decision.

]

the court to "separate out those comments tainted by sexism from

partnership even if her sex had not been a factor in the
Slip op. at 10-11.

The district court disagreed,

noting that Price Waterhouse failed to present evidence enabling

those free of sexism for purposes of demonstrating that non-

l
J

discriminatory factors alone justified the hold decision."
at 10.

.Ig__,._

Therefore, the court concluded that the firm failed to

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made

I
l
l

the same decision if Hopkins' sex had not been a factor in its

J

the supreme Court's review, the district court concluded that it

]
]

l
J

decision not to make her a partner .

.Ig__,._ at 11.

Since this

Court's decision that Hopkins was constructively discharged was
not challenged in the Supreme Court and was "analytically
unrelated to the decision on liability" which was the focus of

constituted the law of the case and, therefore, declined to
reconsider the issue.

9

~

at 12.

Both parties presented evidence on the issue of back pay.
8

-

•,.1·
•,. J

Finding that the alternative of front pay would not make

~~

Hopkins whole for the loss she suffered as a result of Price

.)

Waterhouse's discriminato ry conduct, the court ordered Price

.J
~J
r_1

r.1
~]

·1
:,J

Waterhouse to admit Hopkins as a partner in its firm.

~

at 19.

The court noted that the firm's suggestion that it should merely
be ordered to reconsider Hopkins' candidacy #ould reEult in an
order that is "futile and unjust" because it was clear from the
evidence that they would not voluntarily admit her to the
partnership.

~

The court also awarded Hopkins backpay,

discounted substantiall y because of her failure to mitigate, and
attorney's fees.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Price Waterhouse argued below and argues again on appeal

that it proved that Hopkins would not have been made a partner in
the absence of sex discriminatio n by relying on the negative
comments about her interpersona l relations which were not couched
in sex-based terminology.

The district court was correct,

-J

however, in holding that this was not an adequate response in

::i

light of the evidence that sexual stereotyping permeated Price

-·1
...

CJ
-~]

t1
-~]

~~J

Waterhouse's partnership evaluation process, infecting not only
those negative comments that were couched in sexist terms but
also some of those which were stated in neutral terms.
The Supreme Court's decision in this case makes it plain
that it was Price Waterhouse which bore the burden of separating
the discriminato ry criticisms from the non-discrimi natory ones
and the concomitant risk that they cannot be separated.
9

On

~

,, i
.

-I

remand, Price Waterho use made no attempt to do so.

Accordin gly

-'' ]

have made Ann Hopkins a partner but for her sex and that,

-1

therefo re, its failure to award her a partners hip violated Title

.•J

the distric t court correct ly found that Price Waterho use would

VII.
2.

t

.)

Price Waterho use argues that the distric t court should

have reconsid ered this Court's earlier determi nation that Hopkins
was constru ctively discharg ed.

'

]

Since the legal princip les and

the evidence relevan t to the question of constru ctive discharg e
have not changed since Price Waterho use origina lly argued this

1
]

l
J
I
J

l
]

issue before this Court, the distric t court correctl y held that
it was bound under the doctrine of law of the case by this
Court's holding .
Price Waterho use argues that because Hopkins was respons ible
for not being repropos ed as a partners hip candida te in 1983, it
would work a grave injustic e to award her partners hip.
this argumen t misses the point.

However,

The issue of constru ctive

discharg e is reached only after this Court affirms the finding
that Hopkins would have been a partner in 1982 absent sex
discrim ination.

If Price Waterho use had acted legally in 1982,

the events which took place in 1983 would not have occurred .
Consequ ently, the distric t court's decision , which places Hopkins
in the position she would have been in 1982 absent illegal

]

conduct , is equitab le.

1

powerle ss to order it to grant partners hip to Hopkins despite its
j

]

10

J

3.

Price Waterho use argues that the distric t court was

.

I.

I

v-

i)

,1

J
.J
1
]
]

:]

·1
.l
1
l
]

]
]

finding that she would have been made a partner in the firm but
for her sex.

To the contrary, the court's order was within the

broad remedial discretion granted to the district courts in
§

706(g) of Title VII and was necessary to accomplish one of the

overriding purposes of Title VII relief

victims in the position they would have been in but for the
discriminati on.

Contrary to Price Waterhouse's contention, the

order that Hopkins be made a partner was within the court's
authority under Title VII even if partners at Price Waterhouse
are not employees for purposes of Title VII.

Relations Act, the provision from which§ 706(g) was derived,
authorizes the NLRB to order an employer to place an individual
in a position which is not covered by that statute.

There is no

reason why the same result should not obtain under Title VII .
Price Waterhouse also argues that a court order compelling
it to make an individual a partner interferes with its right to
be the sole determiners of who joins its ranks.

We agree that

courts should always be wary of substituting their judgments of
an individual's suitability for that of the employer,
particularly where subjective factors are involved.

However,

once the district court determined after careful consideration
that Hopkins would have been made a partner but for her sex, it
properly did not hesitate to order that she be made a partner as

]

J

This Court and the

Supreme Court have held that§ lO(c) of the National Labor

part of her make whole relief.

]

placing discriminatio n

11

ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROVE THAT IT WOULD HAVE TAKEN THE SAME
ACTION WITH RESPECT TO HOPKINS' CANDIDACY IN THE ABSENCE OF
DISCRIMINATION, BECAUSE IT DID NOT SHOW THAT THE NEGATIVE
COMMENTS ABOUT PLAINTIFF'S PERSONALITY UPON WHICH IT RELIES
WERE NOT BASED ON SEXUAL STEREOTYPES
On remand, the district court was faced with a record

containing evidence that both legal and illegal motives
influenced Price Waterhouse's decision not to award a partnership
to Ann Hopkins.

The Supreme Court made it clear that Price

Waterhouse bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that its decision would have been the same if it acted
based only on the legal motives and that the firm thus bore "'the
risk that the influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be
separated.'"
quoting

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 109

s. ct. at 1790,

NLRB v. Transportation Management corp,, 462 u.s. 393,

403 (1983).
Price Waterhouse argued below and argues again on appeal
that it carried its burden of proof by relying on those negative

ll

comments about Hopkins' interpersonal relations which were not

---.,

couched in sex-based terminology.

~,~

The district court was

correct, however, in holding that this was not an adequate
response in light of the evidence that sexual stereotyping
permeated the evaluation process, affecting not only those
criticisms that were overtly sexist but also some that were
couched in neutral terms.

-~]
ti

Op. at 8-9.

It is by now established that "Price Waterhouse's
partnership evaluation system was infected by impermissible,

~

'i]
L
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sexu ally stere otyp ed attit ude s towa rd wom en."
825 F.2d at 465.
Alth ough Pric e Wate rhou se does not disp ute this
fact , it
triv iali zes it by acti ng as if the only thin g
wron g with its
cons ider atio n of Hop kins • cand idac y was the exis
tenc e of a few
nega tive comm ents couc hed in sexi st term s. This
is far from the
case . In esta blis hing that Pric e Wat erho use's
cons ider atio n of
her cand idac y for part ners hip was tain ted by sex
disc rimi nati on,
Hop kins did not simp ly show that she was the obje
ct of the
seve ral over tly sexi st state men ts that the firm
now seek s to put
to one side . She dem onst rated that , part icul arly
with resp ect to
pers onal ity trai ts, she was judg ed by a diff eren
t stan dard than

]

male part ners hip cand idat es.

J

of this doub le stan dard were the sex- base d criti
cism s of some
part ners , ther e was cons ider able evid ence that
the same

Alth ough the most blat ant evid ence

J

criti cism s made by othe r part ners in sex- neut
ral term s were
like ly the resu lt of the same ster eoty ping . 10

l

,

Alth ough the exis tenc e of this doub le stan dard
was appa rent
from the trea tmen t of Hop kins ' cand idac y, Hopk
ins offe red, as
"ici ng on the cake '' (Hop kins , 109 s.ct . at 1793
), the testi mon y

l

of Dr. Susa n Fisk e, an expe rt on ster eoty ping
with in busi ness

~

4

l

'
J

1

J

'•
l

"

,o For exam ple, Hopk ins show ed that male
phra sed thei r crit icis m of her, and othe r femapart ners who
le cand idat es for
part ners hip, in blat antl y sexi st term s were neve
r crit iciz ed;
that her supp orte rs ofte n apol ogiz ed for her beha
base d term s refl ecti ng thei r perc epti on that this vior in sexacce ptab le fram e of refe renc e; and that the part was an
resp onsi bilit y for conv eyin g the reas ons for thener who had the
deci sion to Hopk ins stat ed his advi ce to her in nega tive
sex- base d term s
refl ecti ng his perc epti on that thes e were the
conc
erns of the
Adm issio ns Com mitte e.
13
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organizations, who explained why there was a high degree of
probability that some of the negative comments about Hopkins'
personality that were expressed in neutral terms as well as those
expressed in sex-based terms were the product of sexual
stereotyping.

According to Dr. Fiske, in an organization like

Price Waterhouse where assertiveness and independence are
generally considered necessary attributes of a successful
partner, a woman subject to stereotypic standards is placed in a
no-win situation.

If she acts in accordance with stereotypic

expectations by being understanding, tender and soft, she is not
viewed as an effective and formidable manager.

But, if she

behaves in a way that is counter to those expectations, by being
ambitious, competitive and independent, as Ann Hopkins did, she
is viewed as having personality problems.

Tr. at 547.

Despite the evidence that this double standard permeated the
consideration of Hopkins' candidacy for partnership, Price
Waterhouse asked the district court, and now asks this Court, to
accept at face value criticisms of Hopkins' personality as long
as they were not overtly sex-based.

We agree with the district

court that Price Waterhouse could not rely on the facially
neutral criticisms of Hopkins' personality without providing some
evidence that their authors were judging Hopkins by the same
standards that they would apply to a male candidate.

As the

district court noted, the firm could have presented testimony by
the partners making the comments "for appraisal of the
motivations underlying their comments" {op. at 10); or it could
14

have pres ente d exp ert test imo ny cha llen ging
Dr. Fisk e's asse rtio n
tha t the neu tral com men ts were prob ably the
prod uct of sexu al
ster eoty pes . Op. at 9. Hav ing fail ed to
do eith er, Pric e
Wat erho use cann ot pers uasi vely argu e tha t
it carr ied its burd en
ot proo f on rema nd and the dis tric t cou rt's
find ing of liab ilit y
shou ld be affi rme d.

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THIS
EARLIER HOLDING THAT HOPKINS WAS CONSTRUCTIV COURT'S
ELY
DISCHARGED IS THE LAW OF THE CASE
The last time this case was app eale d to this
Cou rt, Hop kins
chal leng ed the dis tric t cou rt's find ing tha
t she had not been
con stru ctiv ely disc harg ed.

Afte r care ful con side rati on, this

Cou rt held tha t Hop kins had been con stru ctiv
ely disc harg ed. The
dis tric t cou rt cor rect ly rebu ffed Pric e Wat
erho use' s effo rt to
reli tiga te the issu e. Und er the doc trin e
of law of the case ,
find ings of fact and con clus ions of law by
an app ella te cou rt

l
J
1

J

1

J
1
j

bind all subs equ ent proc eedi ngs in the same
case , abse nt
exc epti ona l circ ums tanc es. Ariz ona v. Cal
ifor nia. 460 u.s. 605,
618 (198 3).
This doc trin e emb odie s sev eral fund ame ntal
conc erns
in the adm inis trat ion of just ice. It is cru
cial in help ing to
put an end to litig atio n ove r a par ticu lar
issu e (Laf fey v.
Nor thw est Air line s. Inc ,, 642 F.2d 578, 585
co.c. cir. 198 0)); it
also serv es to disc oura ge "pan el shop ping ."
Uni ted Stat es Off ice
of Pers onn el Man agem ent, v, FLRA. No. 88-1
901 (D.C . cir. June 15,
1990 ) (quo ting Lehr man v. Gulf Oil Cor p., 500
F.2d 659, 662 (5th
Cir. 197 4), cer t, den ied, 420 U.S. 929 (197
6)). Acc ordi ngly ,
"[t] o war rant dive rgen ce from law of the case
, a cou rt mus t not
15

only be con vinc ed tha t its ear lier dec
isio n was erro neo us: it
mus t also be sat isfi ed tha t adh eren ce
to the law of the case wil l
wor k a grav e inju stic e." Laffey. 642
F.2d at 585 . Pric e
Wa terh ous e's argu men ts fal l far sho rt
of this stan dar d.

]
]

J

Much ot the firm 's argu men t ign ore s the
fac ts of the cas e.
The issu e of con stru ctiv e disc har ge is
onl y rele van t if this
Cou rt affi rms the dis tric t cou rt's find
ing tha t Pric e Wat erho use
wou ld hav e made Hop kins a par tne r in 198
2 but for the fac t tha t
she was a woman. Alth oug h Hop kins • own
con duc t cau sed the firm
to dec ide not to reco nsid er her for par
tne rsh ip in 198 3, she
wou ld alre ady hav e bee n a par tne r if the
firm had acte d leg ally
in con side ring her can dida cy sev era l mon
ths ear lier . The re is
not hin g ine qui tab le in req uiri ng the firm
to make her who le for
its ear lier ille gal con duc t with out reco
nsid erin g whe ther her
late r dec isio n to leav e the firm was vol
unt ary or a con stru ctiv e
11
disc har ge.
11

Alth oug h it is unn ece ssar y for the cou
rt to add ress the
issu e in ligh t of the find ing tha t Hop
kins
was
con stru ctiv ely
disc har ged , it is far from cle ar tha t
she
wou
ld
hav e been
ine ligi ble for an awa rd of a par tne rsh
ip
eve
n
if
it wer e foun d
tha t she had lef t her job as an ass oci
ate
vol
unt
aril
y. In ruli ng
in his ini tia l dec isio n tha t Hop kins cou
ld
not
be
awa
rded a
par tne rsh ip bec aus e she had not bee n con
~ru
ctiv
ely
disc
harg ed
from her job as an ass oci ate, Jud ge Ges
ell
reli
ed
on
dic
ta in
this cou rt's dec isio n in Cla rk y, Mar sh.
665
F.2d
116
8,
117
2-73
(D. c.ci r. 198 1). Hop kins , 618 F. sup p.
at
112
1.
In
Cla
rk,
this
Cou rt stat ed tha t a Tit le VII pla int iff'
s
ent
itle
men
t
to
an
awa
rd
of the prom otio n she was disc rim ina tori
ly
den
ied
and
back
pay
pas
t
the dat e of her reti rem ent "mu st res t upo
n
pro
of
tha
t
she
•was
not the resp ons ible age nt in [her ) own
at 1112 (qu otin g Wil liam s y. Boo rsti n. term ina tion .'" 665 F.2d
663 F.2d 109 , 119 (D.c .
Cir . 198 0). But Wil liam s invo lved a pla
be rein stat ed t o ~ ~ ,i2l2 tha t he hadint iff' s req ues t tha t he
acti ons . It wou ld be rele van t if Hop kins los t due to his own
rein stat eme nt to her job as an ass oci ate wer e seek ing
afte r she vol unt aril y
16

)

.
The distric t court correctl y rejected Price Waterho use's
argumen t that the appella te decision on this issue was vitiated
when this Court vacated its "mandate " after the Supreme Court's
decision .

Althoug h, as a technica l matter, this court uses the

term mandate to refer to its judgmen t and its opinion, that is
not disposi tive in applying the flexible doctrine of law of the
case.

It is much more signific ant that there has been no change

in the law or the facts since Price Waterho use origina lly argued
the issue before this court.

Francisco.

~

Fadhl

Y,

City and County of San

804 F.2d 1097 (9th cir. 1986) (law of the case

prohibi ts an appella te court from reexamin ing the sufficie ncy of
the evidence in a sex discrim ination case when the court had
before it all the evidence when it first reviewed the case); and

Webster y, sun co,, Inc.,

I
I
I

790 F.2d 157 co.c. cir. 1986) (absent

clear change in governin g law, an appella te court must follow law
of the case set down in opinion of earlier panel).

All of the

evidence on which the firm relies to make its constru ctive
discharg e argumen t on this appeal was availab le to the firm on
the last appeal.

And, the law of constru ctive discharg e has

remained the same since the last appeal.

As the distric t court

noted, Price Waterho use did not seek review of the adverse ruling
on constru ctive discharg e.

Because that issue was "analyt ically

unrelate d to" and "totally distinct " from the issue of liabilit y,
nothing in the Supreme Court's decision affects its legal
left that job, but we fail to see its relevanc e to her request
for the partners hip which she was denied due to Price
Waterho use's discrim inatory action.
17
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Slip op. at 12, 14.
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In fact, as the district court

pointed out, the decision from the last appeal has been relied on
as precedent in numerous decisions in this Circuit 12 and none of
these cases have criticized the constructive discharge ruling or
its reasoning.

Therefore, because there is no new evidence or

change in the governing law and no manifest injustice would
result from adhering to the constructive discharge holding, it
would be contrary to the principles of common sense and judicial
economy which underlie the doctrine of law of the case to permit
Price Waterhouse to relitigate the issue.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS AUTHORIZED BY TITLE VII TO AWARD
PARTNERSHIP TO A QUALIFIED CANDIDATE WHO WOULD HAVE
BEEN MADE A PARTNER BY THE FIRM BUT FOR HER SEX
Price Waterhouse argues that the district court was
powerless to order it to make Ann Hopkins a partner despite its
finding that she would have been made a partner by the firm but
for her sex.

tI

The firm, however, offers no basis in law or policy

for such a narrow reading of a court's remedial authority under
Title VII.

On the contrary, as this Court recently reiterated,

t1

Title VII requires courts to award "the most complete relief

C

F.2d 153, 156 (D.c. Cir. 1989) (citing Franks v. Bowman

possible" to victims of discrimination.

Transportation co., 424

u.s.

Lander v, Lujan. 888

747, 754 (1976)).

12

The overriding

see Katradis v. Dav-El of Washington, o,c., 846 F.2d
1482, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Simpson v. Federal Mine Safety &
Health Review commission. 842 F.2d 453, 462 (D.C. cir. 1988);
Dashnaw v. Secretary of Transportation. 1989 u.s. Dist. LEXIS
16480 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 1988); Palmer v, Barry, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17343 (o.o.c. September 30, 1988); DeMarco y, Thomas, 1988
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12315 (O.O.C. April 8, 1988).
18

prin cipl e of Titl e VII reli ef is tha t, abse
nt extr aord inar y
circ ums tanc es, disc rim inat ion vict ims shou
ld be plac ed in the
pos itio n they wou ld have been in but for the
disc rim inat ion.
The dis tric t cou rt foun d in this case tha t
Hop kins "fai led
to rece ive part ners hip at the time she was
held ove r beca use of
sex disc rim inat ion, in vio lati on of
Titl e VII ." Op. at 11.
The refo re, beca use an awa rd of part ners hip
is reli ef spe cifi call

•
j

t

1

I
I

y

tail ore d to the cond uct foun d to have viol
ated the law, it is the
mos t effi cien t and equ itab le reme dy ava ilab
le. 13
The dis tric t cou rt corr ectl y reco gniz ed that
a fron t pay
awar d wou ld not con stit ute full reli ef.
Hop kins has stat ed
repe ated ly tha t she wan ts part ners hip at Pric
e Wat erho use beca use
of tha t firm 's uniq ue pos ture in the bus ines
s com mun ity. A
mon etar y awa rd, ther efor e, wou ld not con stit
ute com plet e reli ef.
~

Human Relations comm'n v. Thorp. Reed & Armstrong.

361 A.2d

497, 502 (Pa. Commw. Ct 1976 ) (ben efit s accr
uing from a
pro fess iona l care er are not mea sure d in dol
lars alon e
ther e is
also the ben efit of pres tige in bein g asso
ciat ed with an
esta blis hed firm ).

Fur ther , as a part ner, Hop kins will be
ent itle d to shar es of the firm 's annu al earn
ings . For a cou rt

to

calc ulat e an exa ct dol lar amo unt for each
shar e and anti cipa te
13

Pric e Wat erho use' s argu men t that an orde r
that it
reco nsid er Hop kins for part ners hip wou ld full
y
reme
dy the
disc rim inat ion foun d simp ly igno res the dis
tric
t
cou
rt's find ing
on rema nd tha t it wou ld have awa rded her a
part
ners
hip
in 1982
but for her sex. In ligh t of this find ing,
it
is
esta
blis
hed
tha t the vio lati on here was not mer ely a fail
ure
to
con
side
r
Hop kins fair ly, but a fail ure to awa rd her
a
part
ners
hip
beca
use
of her sex.
19
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the numb er of share s she would be entit led to throu ghou t
her
busin ess life would prese nt sever e diffi culti es, which are
avoid ed by the cour t's order that she be made a partn er.

Op. at

19.

Cont rary to Price Wate rhous e's conte ntion , the langu age of
§ 706(g ) of Title VII, 42 u.s.c . § 2000 e-5(g
), is broad enoug h to
autho rize the relie f order ed in this case. Secti on 706(g )
provi des that, once a Title VII viola tion is found , a court
can
"orde r such affirm ative actio n as may be appro priat e, which
may
inclu de, but is not limit ed to, reins tatem ent or hirin g of
emplo yees, with or witho ut backp ay, or any other equit able
relie f
the court deems appro priat e." (Emp hasis added ). To be sure,
as
Price Wate rhous e notes , the maxim eiusd em gene ris opera tes
to
limi t§ 706(g ) 's gener al words to matte rs simil ar to the spec
ific
terms which follow . The relie f order ed by the court in this
case
is close ly analo gous to the relie f whic h§ 706(g ) autho rizes
in
cases invol ving discr imina tion in prom otion to high- level
jobs.
An order requi ring reins tatem ent and backp ay is aimed at
resto ring the econo mic statu s quo that would have been attain
ed
but for the discr imina tion. Frank s, 424 u.s. at 764. The
distr ict cour t's award of partn ershi p to Hopk ins achie ves
the
same resu lt in a simil ar conte xt and is, there fore, relie f
of the
gener al kind, class or natur e as the remed ies ident ified in
§

706 (g) •

Price Water house also argue s that an order that Hopk ins be
made a partn er was beyon d the distr ict cour t's autho rity in
a
20
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loye es cove red by
Titl e VII acti on beca use part ners are not emp
e Wate rhou se are
Titl e VII. Even assu ming that part ners in Pric
cou rts, incl udin g this cour t and the Supr eme
l0(c )
reje cted the same argu men t in the cont ext of§

not emp loye es,
Cou rt, have

14

u.s. c. § 160( c),
of the Nati onal Labo r Rela tion s Act (NLRA), 29
15
In
was base d.
the prov ision upon whi ch§ 706( g) of Titl e VII
(197 3),
Golden Gate Stat e Bott ling Co, y. NLRB~ 414 U.S. 168, 188
reme dy a viol atio n
the Supr eme Cou rt held that , when nece ssar y to
d was auth oriz ed by
of the NLRA, the Nati onal Labo r Rela tion s Boar
empl oyee as an
§ l0(c ) to orde r an emp loye r to hire a form er
that inde pend ent
inde pend ent con trac tor, notw ithst andi ng the fact
NLRA. That
cont ract ors are not cove red empl oyee s unde r the
ic Wor kers Int' l
hold ing w~s follo wed in Oil, Chem ical and Atom
. Cir. 1976 ), wher e
Unio n, AFL-CIO v. NLRB. 547 F.2d 575, 589 (D.C
empl oyee shou ld be
this Cou rt held that a form er non- supe rviso ry
tion desp ite the
rein stat ed and prom oted to a supe rvis ory posi
es unde r the NLRA.
fact that supe rvis ors are not cove red emp loye
are not
Pric e Wate rhou se assu mes that its part ners ersh
ip inte rest
own
an
have
they
emp loye es unde r Titl e VII beca use
and empl oyee are
in the firm . How ever, the posi tion s of part ner
ing inhe rent ly
noth
is
re
"The
not nece ssar ily mutu ally excl usiv e.
ry and an
rieta
prop
.a
of
inco nsis tent betw een the co-e xiste nce
e
Hous
r
take
empl oyme nt rela tion ship ." Gold berg v. Whi
s in
lder
reho
(sha
Coo pera tive. Inc, , 366 U.S. 28, 32 (196 1)s unde r the FLSA).
knit wea r coop erat ive held to be empl oyee
this case , the
Alth ough the cour t does not reac h the issu e a in
ner is an
part
Com miss ion take s the posi tion that whe ther nces of the
empl oyee depe nds on the part icul ar circu msta EEOC Deci sion No.
indi vidu al's rela tion with the part ners hip. , 7041 n.4, 37 FEP
85-4 , Emp. Prac . Guid e {CCH) 1 6840 at 7040
case s 1885 (Mar ch 18, 1984 ).
14
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Ford Moto r co. v. EEOC, 458

(198 2).
21

u.s. 219, 226 n.8

~~,NLRB
cir. 1953).

Y,

Bell Aircraft Corp,.

As the court stated in

206 F.2d 235, 236-37 (2d

Bell Aircraft,

At the time the discrimination took place, [the
employee) was clearly a protected employee, and his
prospects for promotion were among the conditions of
his employment. The [NLRA) protected him so long as he
held a nonsupervisory position, and it is immaterial
that the protection thereby afforded was calculated to
enable him to obtain a position in which he would no
longer be protected.
206 F.2d at 236-37.

In

Hishon Y, King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69

(1983), the supreme court held that, whether or not partners are

employees for purposes of Title VII, advancement to partnership
is a privilege of an associate's employment which must be awarded
on a non-discriminatory basis.
1781 n.l.

S,ll

~

Hopkins,

109 u.s. at

Although the Hishon court did not decide whether a

court could order partnership when promotion to partnership is

J

I

I

discriminatorily denied, there is nothing in Hishon which
suggests that a court finding such a violation should not follow
the practice the Supreme Court has approved under the NLR~ and
award make whole relief even if it means that the individual will
be placed in a position which is itself not covered by Title VII.
Price Waterhouse's argument that partnership should not be
awarded because of the special nature of ~he partnership
relationship (see Br. at 30) is similar to the argument made by
colleges and universities that tenure should never be awarded as
a Title VII remedy.

l
l

In both cases, there is a valid argument

that courts should be cautious to avoid substituting their
judgment for the opinions of the partners and faculty members
entrusted with deciding who should attain partnership or tenure.
22

l con side rati on, a cou rt
Als o, in bot h cas es, whe re, afte r car efu
was den ied a par tne rsh ip
dete rmi nes tha t a qua lifi ed ind ivid ual
al orig in or reli gio n, it
or ten ure bec aus e of rac e, sex , nat ion
rel ief incl udi ng an award
sho uld not hes itat e to ord er make who le
~ Brown y. Tru stee s
of the sta tus tha t was ille gal ly den ied.
0) (aff irm ing
of Bos ton uni ver sity , 891 F.2d 337 (1s t cir . 199
rim ina tion in den ial of
award of ten ure as rem edy for sex disc
(Jun e 18, 199 0); Kunda v.
ten ure ), cer t. den ied, 58 u.s. L.W . 3796
198 0) (aff irm ing gra nt
Muh lenb erg col leg e, 621 F.2d 532 .(3d cir.
858 (6th cir . 198 4)
of ten ure ); and Ford v. Nic ks, 741 F.2d
ten ure ).
(aff irm ing ord er of rein stat eme nt with
rd of par tne rsh ip to
Pric e Wa terh ous e's argu men t tha t the awa
of ass oci atio n und er the
Hop kins imp lica tes its righ t to free dom
the argu men t reje cted by
Fir st Amendment is sim ply a reha sh of
rt note d in tha t cas e,
the Sup rem e Cou rt in His hon . As the Cou
be cha rac teri zed as a
"'[i )nv idio us priv ate disc rim ina tion may
n pro tect ed by the Fir st
form of exe rcis ing free dom of ass oci atio
affi rma tive
Ame ndm ent, but it has nev er been acco rded
109 U.S . at 223 5, quo ting
con stit utio nal pro tec tion s."' His hon ,
(1?7 3). Jus t as Pric e
Norwood v. Har riso n, 413 u.s . 455 , 470
trin e of free dom of
Wat erho use cou ld not hide beh ind the doc
ying Ann Hop kins
ass oci atio n to avo id liab ilit y for den
it can not use free dom of
par tne rsh ip bec aus e of her sex in 198 2,
affo rd her righ tful plac e
ass oci atio n as an exc use for fail ing to
in the par tne rsh ip toda y.

23

Price Waterhouse also argues that, even if the court had the
authority to award partnership, it abused its discretion in
awarding one in this case because of Hopkins' admitted
personality problems.

Once again, the firm's argument ignores

the finding of the district court that Hopkins' behavior would
not have prevented her from obtaining partnership if she had been
a man.

Given this finding, which is well supported by the

evidence, there is no basis for arguing that her admission to the
firm at this time was an abuse of discretion.

Accordingly, the

district court's order that Price Waterhouse admit Ann Hopkins as
a partner in the firm should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
DONALD R. LIVINGSTON
General Counsel (Acting)
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Associate General Counsel
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